Abstract

Abstract for: Cost-Sharing for Blockchain-Enabled Collaborative Governance of Fruit Tree Residues Based on a System Dynamics Approach

Introduction Agricultural wastes such as fruit tree pruning residues are generated in large quantities, and improper disposal may cause environmental pollution and safety risks. Current governance is government-led and involves multiple stakeholders, yet information asymmetry and limited traceability constrain collaboration. These issues weaken participation willingness and reduce enterprises’ incentives to invest in resource utilization.
Approach This study develops two blockchain adoption scenarios: a government-led model and a government–enterprise cooperative model. A system dynamics approach is applied to capture feedback structures and time-delay effects. Under the Pressure–State–Response framework, a stock–flow model is constructed, integrating traditional governance, enterprise investment and returns, and blockchain empowerment subsystems.
Results Simulation results indicate that different cost-sharing mechanisms significantly influence governance performance and enterprise profitability. The government–enterprise cooperative model demonstrates stronger incentives for enterprise participation and improved waste reduction efficiency, while excessive reliance on government-led investment may limit long-term system sustainability and reduce dynamic efficiency.
Discussion The findings suggest that appropriate cost-sharing arrangements are essential for enhancing collaborative governance effectiveness. Policy design should emphasize phased government support, reasonable investment pacing, and sustainable platform operation. Blockchain-enabled governance requires balancing cost burdens and incentive alignment to achieve both environmental and economic objectives.

Introduction	Agricultural wastes such as fruit tree pruning residues are generated in large quantities, and improper disposal may cause environmental pollution and safety risks. Current governance is government-led and involves multiple stakeholders, yet information asymmetry and limited traceability constrain collaboration. These issues weaken participation willingness and reduce enterprises’ incentives to invest in resource utilization.
Approach	This study develops two blockchain adoption scenarios: a government-led model and a government–enterprise cooperative model. A system dynamics approach is applied to capture feedback structures and time-delay effects. Under the Pressure–State–Response framework, a stock–flow model is constructed, integrating traditional governance, enterprise investment and returns, and blockchain empowerment subsystems.
Results	Simulation results indicate that different cost-sharing mechanisms significantly influence governance performance and enterprise profitability. The government–enterprise cooperative model demonstrates stronger incentives for enterprise participation and improved waste reduction efficiency, while excessive reliance on government-led investment may limit long-term system sustainability and reduce dynamic efficiency.
Discussion	The findings suggest that appropriate cost-sharing arrangements are essential for enhancing collaborative governance effectiveness. Policy design should emphasize phased government support, reasonable investment pacing, and sustainable platform operation. Blockchain-enabled governance requires balancing cost burdens and incentive alignment to achieve both environmental and economic objectives.