Abstract for: Tax N Vote: Breaking the Two-Party Duopoly Through Direct Congressional Fiscal Feedback

The United States' winner-take-all electoral framework creates mathematically stable two-party duopolies that constrain democratic expression to binary choices controlled by partisan gatekeepers. Traditional accountability mechanisms operate exclusively through party-mediated channels with substantial delays and manipulation vulnerabilities. Tax N Vote fundamentally restructures this system by establishing a direct fiscal feedback pathway from citizens to Congress that circumvents party control at zero additional taxpayer cost, leveraging existing IRS infrastructure to enable continuous, high-dimensional budget preference expression independent of electoral cycles. Budgetary authority represents systemic control. We construct a rigorous system dynamics model establishing novel fiscal feedback pathways to Congress through reinforcing loop structures. Quantitative simulation employs stock-flow methodology with six feedback loops integrating budget comparison as continuous error signal. Grounded in control theory, participatory governance literature, and platform competition economics, the model operationalizes E = Σ|Pi - Ci| across 1,000 federal accounts, generating self-adjusting dynamics that systematically reduce divergence between aggregated citizen preferences and legislative action. Preliminary simulation indicates critical threshold emergence at 30% taxpayer participation, where dual-pressure accountability compels measurable congressional response. Initial modeling suggests 35% budget discrepancy reduction within four annual cycles through continuous error-correction mechanisms. Template customization analysis demonstrates combinatorial explosion preventing partisan control. Early results show competitive advertising generating civic education as positive externality. Integrating system dynamics methodology with structural demographic modeling and control theory establishes quantifiable framework for enhancing representative responsiveness and reducing political polarization. The error-correction framework provides mathematical rigor to democratic representation, shifting accountability from episodic to continuous. Template customization creates emergent duopoly breakdown through combinatorial explosion, not voter revolution. Competitive advertising transforms zero-sum political competition into positive-sum civic education. Future work should model dynamic political support, customization learning curves, optimal account granularity, and coalition formation as duopoly dissolves. Format the paper