

# Fighting Foreign Fighters

## But What About Wannabe and Returning Foreign Fighters?

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**Abstract:** *Foreign fighters, wannabe foreign fighters, and returned foreign fighters have occupied the European news bulletins for many months. Foreign fighters voluntarily join fighting parties in conflict zones, like in Syria and Iraq. Both wannabe foreign fighters and returning foreign fighters from these and other regions directly pose a substantial real threat to Western nations. And actual foreign fighters pose a direct foreign threat as well as an indirect domestic threat. In spite of the fact that the general public opinion supports the perspective that there is a domestic foreign-fighter related security problem, perspectives between and within Western nations as to the causes and solutions differ. In this paper, we present SD models that correspond to three of these perspectives. These models are simulated in view of finding robust policies, i.e. policies that work across different perspectives.*

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Radicalization and Foreign Fighters

On Monday 16, the Guardian published an article about three young men, who were captured in Turkey on their way to Syria, where they planned to join the “Islamic State” (IS). They were deported to Britain, where they were arrested (Waeber & Dodd, 2015). It was the latest in a series of reported events that shows a worrying phenomenon : young men and women travel to conflict zones – especially Syria – and join the IS war.

‘Foreign fighters’ (FF) is the term used to describe people that adhere to this *modus operandi*. The phenomenon is not new: it can be traced back to the Soviet War in Afghanistan in the 1980s when the Red Army occupied the territories for ten years. Many Arab Muslims went to Afghanistan to support the local population joining the jihad against the atheist soldiers.

As the civil war in Syria continues, the FF flow may increase (Byman & Shapiro, 2014). And today's digital media further enhance direct communication and influence between foreign fighters and the rest of the

world. The latest terrorist attacks in Europe clearly revealed an important connection between the civil war in Syria and terrorist threats against Western Countries.

The experience from Afghanistan in the '80s offers an opportunity to create a schematic model of the process that leads potential militants to become foreign fighters. The model is general, but with variations, it partially explains what is happening.

### 1<sup>st</sup> step- Radicalization

The first step is the radicalization process of the individual. Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of radicalization, it could be defined as the process whereby people become extremists (Neumann, 2013). Another definition more focused on the violent side of the phenomenon and on its relations with terrorist operations is the one adopted by the Expert Group on Violent Radicalization led by Dr. Fernando Reinares: «socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism» (European Commission's Expert Group Radicalization, 2008). The broadness of these definitions represents the ambiguity of the concept. Some consider radicalization to be the process that leads to acts of violence and/or terror (*behavioral radicalization*). Others relate radicalization to the degree to which individuals support political ideas diametrically opposed to a society's "mainstream" beliefs (*cognitive radicalization*). The question whether cognitive radicalization is a sufficient or necessary condition for acts of terror remains unanswered. Many view cognitive radicalization as just one of the factors that can lead to radical behavior and that radical political ideas do not necessarily lead to radical actions. Other factors include the political and social context and the individual characteristics (Neumann, 2013).

The ambiguity of the concept of radicalization and the wide range of opinions on what radicalization is and which factors trigger it, gives rise to a broad spectrum of approaches to fight it (Sedgwick, 2010).

Two main approaches can be distinguished.

- The first, mainly observed in the Anglo-Saxon world - both in literature and strategies of countries - is more concerned with actions that impugn the behavioral aspect of radicalization (e.g. the illegal acts or acts of violence/terror). This approach can account for successes in the short-term (avoiding/detering terrorist attacks), but it has the disadvantage of not taking into account the long-term effects of the phenomenon.
- The second approach is concerned with fighting the cognitive aspect of radicalization. It is focused on trying to counter "extremist" ideas aimed at destabilizing socio-political and institutional structures in order to give birth to new orders/societies. This approach is often observed in European countries. Although it aims at eliminating the factors that – in the long run – might lead to the emergence of Islamic extremism, this approach may lack options when it comes to counter radicalization and/or terrorism in the short term (Neumann, 2013).

### 2<sup>nd</sup> step-Decide to join a conflict

Once the individual went through the process of radicalization, he/she decides whether to join an armed conflict or not. Officials believe that the reason for that decision is less an act of religious ideology and more an act of young rebellion (Byman & Shapiro, 2014). However, the motives may be a little more complex than that.

In the past, the motivation was a desire to help oppressed, poor people defend themselves against larger than them powers (Afghanistan vs. ESSR, etc.). This situation changed with the Syrian civil war, although not immediately. In the beginning of the war, the same (romantic) desire still existed. Moreover, there was also a motive to seek excitement and adventure (as the officials state) (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

However, the situation has changed. Although the desire to prove toughness and make oneself a hero has remained, the rise of IS offered other motives that seem to be stronger than before. First, the battle in Syria is 'advertised' as a religious, eschatological war. Religious, because the conflict is between Sunnis and Shiites and eschatological because the battle is presented as the battle of God against His enemies (Byman & Shapiro, 2014). Moreover, IS does not share the worldview of al Qaeda and that is reflected on their strategic decisions. Where al-Qaeda (AQ) attracted followers with a pseudo-religious message of a future *ummah*, The IS is offering a Muslim caliphate now. For the IS, the importance lies in establishing an area –through raw power and revenge – where the political borders of the Middle East countries that were created by the Great (Western powers) during the 20<sup>th</sup> century do not longer exist, placing IS in the sole position of governing 'pure' Sunni Muslims. In other words, what IS offers is instant and immediate gratification (Cronin, 2015). Finally, young westerns have political motivations stemming from their home-countries attitude towards Muslim nations (Qureshi, 2014).

### 3<sup>rd</sup> step-Travel to the war zone

Traveling to the war zone has become easy, especially for people from the United States and European countries, whose passports allow them to travel anywhere in the world. For Syria, there are a number of crossings from Turkey, whose policy so far has been not to intervene much, in case new tensions rise with the Kurdish population. However, the scale of the flown foreign fighters has become so great that the Turkish authorities have started worrying and lately they provide more assistance to Western countries (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

The number of foreign fighters traveling to Syria is not exact, although its scale is characterized as unprecedented (Byman & Shapiro, 2014). US intelligence agencies estimate that the number lies around 15000 people from 80 countries, at the rate of about 1000 people per month (Cronin, 2015). Many of them come from European countries, even countries that had not faced a similar phenomenon in the past like Switzerland and Finland

### 4<sup>th</sup> Step-Train and Fight

Upon arrival, they are trained in the use of weapons and explosives in training camps that provide a sense of comradeship and of belonging in the same community. Not everyone that goes into a war zone becomes a fighter; many of them are also used for administrative operations or even diminished to jobs that are not appropriate for 'pure' warriors or even they are tasked with the 'holy duty' of becoming suicide bombers (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

In the training camps the contact with other extremist occurs and the foreign fighters either become disillusioned about the nature of their 'mission' or they come to encompass a broader set of goals like attacking their home-countries (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

## 5<sup>th</sup> Step-Returning home

If they do not die abroad, many foreign fighters go back home. There they could either re-integrate in the society or remain active, recruit others and plot terrorist attacks. It is the latter that mostly worries European authorities (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

### 1.2 Governments' Responses

The deadly attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Glasgow (2007), Stockholm (2010), followed by the foiled attempts and arrests in Copenhagen (2010) and Berlin (2011) have contributed to move the issue of violent extremism and "radicalisation" back up on the European political agenda. To identify, detect and address the underlying factors that lead some individuals to participate in violent acts has become critical for the EU member states (EUMS). However, the way different European countries approach this topic is quite different. Despite these, while recognising EU States' authority as security-providers, the EU adopted a Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (Council of the European Union, 14781/1/05) which contains joint standards and measures that aim at preventing terrorist radicalisation and recruitment, grouped under three key headings: (1) disrupt the activities of individuals and networks that draw people into terrorism; (2) ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism; (3) promote security, justice, democracy and opportunities for all more vigorously. Addressing and stopping terrorist radicalisation and recruitment is a priority for the EU, as outlined in the Strategy. Radicalisation in this sense is understood as a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts. Under the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, the Commission promotes actions empowering communities and key groups that are engaged in the prevention of terrorist radicalisation and recruitment. To this end, it has established an EU-wide Radicalisation Awareness Network, which connects key groups of people involved in countering violent radicalisation across the EU. To further support its actions, the Commission has also asked the RAN to gather relevant existing practices in the EU in a lively compendium: this collection of approaches, lessons learned and practices presents a set of eight practitioners' approaches in the field of prevention of radicalisation, each of them illustrated by a number of selected practices and projects.

The strategy was revised in 2008 and follow up by the EU Commission communication on "Preventing Radicalisation to terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response" (COM(2013) 941 final) released in January 2014. The communication clearly pointed out that although Several Member States have already implemented measures to prevent radicalisation, comprehensive approaches under the strand of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy aimed at addressing radicalisation and recruitment are not widely used. So, despite the increasing intensity of the phenomenon, the European Union and the European countries individually lack a coherent approach to foreign fighters. The pillars of their reaction are the same: fighting radicalization, preventing them from leaving, measures once they return. However, different countries interpret those actions differently and apply different types of policies.

The following Table 1 presents the measures that European countries take to tackle the problem of foreign fighters across the different steps that were described before.

The list of measures demonstrates the diversity in the philosophy of the European countries. The political situation becomes more complex, with the rise of 'neo-nationalism' in Europe, which prevents

governments to reinforce re-integration processes (Sedgwick, 2010). In that context, it is interesting to note that many countries are more worried about the programs/policies of their neighbors and fear that terrorist attacks may originate from there, than their own population (Byman & Shapiro, 2014).

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Table 1 presents the measures that European countries take to tackle the problem of foreign fighters across the different steps that were described before. The table reflects the diversity in philosophies of different European countries. Some countries, like France and the Western Balkans, adhere to a rather hard and repressive philosophy. This philosophy could be summarized with the slogan: “Keep them here and jail upon return”. Other countries, like Denmark and Finland, adhere to a much softer re-integration philosophy. This philosophy could be summarized with the slogan: “Let’s talk and help to (re-)integrate”. Some countries seem to be trying to combine both philosophies. Apart from these official philosophies, there seems to be a third philosophy that could be captured with the slogan “Go, if you don’t like it here, and never come back”. So far, there are no countries that officially adhere to this philosophy (since it goes counter to international treaties), although both leftwing and rightwing political parties and politicians do.

### 1.3 Organization of the Paper

In the remainder of the paper, we will use a model-based approach to investigate possible effects of these different philosophies in combination with different policies. Starting from a simple core model, we will construct different simulation models in section 2. These alternative models will be simulated and analysed in section 3. In section 4, we will perform policy analyses and try to improve the most promising policies. Section 5 comprises a discussion, current and future work related to our line of research, and concluding remarks. Finally, the appendix contains a teaching and testing case about foreign fighters and possible domestic extremism by returning and wannabe foreign fighters.

Table 1 Measures for foreign fighters across different countries

	UK	Denmark	Germany	France	CH	Finland	Western Balkans	Netherlands
<b>Prevention of radicalization</b>			Recent efforts in cooperation with local communities (Heinke & Raudszus, 2015)					de-radicalization program (Qureshi, 2014)
<b>Prevention of travel</b>	passport confiscation- (Byman & Shapiro, 2014) illegal to travel to Syria with the purpose of taking an active role in the hostilities (Byman & Shapiro, 2014); (Qureshi, 2014)	talk to youngsters before going abroad (Byman & Shapiro, 2014)	passport confiscation, prohibition of going to Syria to fight (Heinke & Raudszus, 2015)	passport confiscation, talk to potential foreign fighters, 'hotlines' for families (Byman & Shapiro, 2014)		Government cannot prevent from traveling (Saarinen, 2014)	Prosecution of traveling to Syria (Albania & FYROM) Interviews with potential foreign fighters (Bosnia) (Holman, 2014)	illegal to travel to Syria with the purpose of taking an active role in the hostilities (Qureshi, 2014)  Cooperation with Turkey Denial of passports (Batraawi & Chmoun, 2014)
<b>Measures upon return</b>	Promotes prosecution (Byman & Shapiro, 2014)	Careful evaluation. The government must prove that the returnees have participated in terrorist actions (Byman & Shapiro, 2014)	Monitoring of returnees	Systematical prosecution of returned foreign fighters (Byman & Shapiro, 2014)	Monitoring (Glaus & Vildino, 2014)	Foreign fighters are not criminalized under law (Saarinen, 2014)	Arrests on accusation of planning and preparing an attack (Kosovo) Prosecution of returned foreign fighters (Bosnia) (Holman, 2014)	Measures to help returnees to re-integrate in society. However, due to polarization of the Dutch society criminalization is promoted (Batraawi, 2013)
<b>Prison regime</b>	convicted foreign fighters dispersed across high security prisons (Neumann, 2010)			convicted foreign fighters dispersed across high security prisons (Neumann, 2010)				concentration in 'terrorism wing' of a high security prison (Neumann, 2010)
	Incentives to rehabilitate in prison (Neumann, 2010)			Incentives to rehabilitate in prison (Neumann, 2010)				

## 2. Philosophies and Models

### 2.1. The Core Model

The core model used in the remainder of the paper is displayed in Figure 1. It is a first, highly aggregated, generic model about the potential domestic effects of foreign fighters. New activists, influenced or recruited by foreign fighters as well as free domestic extremists and domestically jailed extremists, first join the group of activists and potential extremists. New foreign fighters as well as new domestic extremists originate from this group. Activists and potential extremists can also defect from this group, here due to excessive domestic extremism and violence. Foreign fighters may get killed or may return. Upon their return, they may be jailed (whether they are extremists or not) or not. Those who are jailed may further radicalize or defect.

A slightly more detailed version of this core model is adapted to each of three perspectives in the next subsections. These models are subsequently used to simulate sets of policies that correspond to each of the different perspectives/philosophies/models.




Figure 1: SFD of the core SD model regarding Foreign Fighters, Potential Foreign Fighters, and Returning Foreign Fighters

## 2.2. Philosophy 1: “Keep them here and jail upon return”

Many European governments officially support this perspective. Arguments/assumptions on which the rhetoric used by proponents of this perspective is based are:

- We are bound by legal and moral obligations to keep wannabe foreign fighters from travelling to conflict zones
- Multimedia / media attention enable foreign fighters to “infect” potential foreign fighters
- Foreign fighters radicalize further in conflict zones
- Foreign fighters are trained to use arms, which upon their return may be used domestically
- Each returning foreign fighter is a potential domestic security threat – we just don’t know whom
- Each returning foreign fighter is a potential domestic hate preacher or figure head for potential wannabe foreign fighters
- We should minimize our domestic security threats, even if it is at the expense of innocent individuals
- Returning foreign fighters need to be punished here for crimes committed elsewhere
- Returning foreign fighters and potential domestic terrorists need to be punished here for being part of terrorist organisations,
- Potential wannabe foreign fighters should be punished for covert terrorist intentions

Based on their line of reasoning, their preferred policies are to prevent wannabe foreign fighters from leaving, even to lock them up, and to jail anyone who may be a returning foreign fighter. This is visualized in Figure 2.




Figure 2: The “Keep them here and jail upon return” perspective

### 2.3. Philosophy 2: “Let’s talk and help to (re-)integrate”

This philosophy corresponds to the model of the Danish government. Arguments/assumptions on which the rhetoric used by proponents of this perspective is based are:

- Radicalized individuals can be de-radicalized or re-socialized
- Foreign fighters mainly return for other reasons than to fight domestically
- Killed foreign fighters cause others to radicalize, hence wannabe foreign fighters should be re-integrated so that they do not leave
- Jailing is bad, because radicals radicalize inside prisons, jailed radicals infect others inside prisons, jailed radicals cause others to radicalize outside prisons

Based on this line of reasoning, the policy should be to help wannabe and returning foreign fighters to de-radicalize, re-socialize, and re-integrate.




Figure 3: The “Let’s support different processes of (re-)integration” perspective

### 2.4. Philosophy 3: “Go, if you don’t like it here, and never come back”

Arguments/assumptions on which the rhetoric of proponents of this perspective is based are:

- Radical ideas are not, and should not be, part of Western society
- Radicalized individuals cannot be de-radicalized or re-socialized
- Those who may possibly radicalize should be shielded from those who are radicalized

- Radicalized individuals are further frustrated if they are being prevented from joining foreign fights and may channel their frustration into domestic extremism or terrorism
- Frustrated domestic radicals infect more potential wannabe radicals than foreign fighters
- Foreign fighters may get killed in which case they do not come back
- Killed foreign fighters do not cause others to radicalize
- Communication from foreign fighters should be minimized

Based on this line of reasoning, the policy should be to help Western Jihadists that cannot be de-radicalized to leave the West and prevent them from coming back, while cutting communication between foreign fighters and potential wannabe fighters.




Figure 4: The “Go, if you don’t like it here, and never come back” perspective

### 3. Multi-Philosophy Simulation

#### 3.1 General Simulation Set-Up

The three models are simulated across a parametric uncertainty space and for different sets of policies. The uncertainties and their ranges, the details of the sets of policies, as well as all visualizations and analyses are available online: <http://nbviewer.ipython.org/gist/anonymous/7d0887fe36714688ff5c> . The graphs available online differ from the ones in the paper: in the paper we only show the envelopes of all simulation runs whereas in the online notebook we also show 10 random runs per model or policy.

Each time, 500 simulation runs are generated using a Latin Hypercube sampling plan for each philosophy/perspective/model and each set of policies. That is, philosophy/perspective/model and each set of policies are sampled following a full factorial sampling plan. In other words, a total of 4500 simulations are generated for three models and three policy sets that correspond to the three policies

(3x3). 6000 simulations are generated if, in addition, the “no policies” set is simulated across these models.

Finally, there is a very crucial assumption in the model regarding the development of attention related to the conflict (variable “general M and MM attention FF”): it is assumed that attention varies from 0% at the start in month 0, to 5% at the beginning of month 3, to 75% at the beginning of month 4, to 50% at the beginning of month 16, to 100% at the beginning of month 24, to 25% at the beginning of month 36, to 10% at the beginning of month 51, to 0 at the beginning of month 60. In other words, we assume (the attention paid to) the conflict peaks after two years and ends after 3-5 years.

### 3.2 Simulations of Different Philosophies/Perspectives/Models without Policies

Figure 5 shows envelopes for the three philosophies/perspectives/models without any policy (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts). Note that without any policy, the models are the same as the core model. Models fundamentally differ in how they are affected by policies. Figure 5 shows that, without policies, the three philosophies generate the same envelopes, as should have been the case.




Figure 5: Envelopes for the different philosophies without any policies (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)

By looking at Figure 5, it can be said in general that, on the ensemble level and without policies, the domestic FF threat follows the foreign FF security issue, both with a small delay and a long delay. Figure 5 also shows that very broad envelopes are generated with these philosophies/models, uncertainties and without any policies. Simulations range from situations with hardly any effects to situations with catastrophic domestic effects. The extent of the effects is nevertheless not what matters most from a security point of view, rather whether policies allow to deal with the overall risk. This will be investigated in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.

### 3.2 The Different Philosophies/Perspectives/Models across the Alternative Policy Sets

Figure 6 displays the effects of the three policy sets on the different philosophies/perspectives/models. This figure shows, in other words, whether from each of the perspectives, the risk is manageable with random sets of policies. Figure 6 shows that the risk is, on the ensemble level, least manageable as perceived from the first perspective, and most manageable from the second perspective. This could mean two things: either one of the policy sets does not work from the first perspective, or the risk itself cannot be managed properly from the first perspective. This means we need to visualize the alternative sets of policies across the different philosophies/perspectives/models as well as the alternative policy sets for each philosophy/perspective/model, especially philosophy/perspective/model 2.




Figure 6: Three perspectives/philosophies/models across three sets of policies (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)

### 3.3 The Alternative Policy Sets across The Different Philosophies/Perspectives/Models

Figure 7 displays the effects of the three sets of policies across the different philosophies/models. Two very interesting conclusions, again on the ensemble level, could be drawn from it: (i) the third set of policies that corresponds to the “Go and Never Come Back” perspective is best in terms of domestic key performance indicators [or, differently phrased, the first and second perspective partly turn a foreign security problem into a domestic security problem], and (ii) the second set of policies seems to be slightly better than the first set of policies. The latter conclusion needs to be investigated in more detail.




Figure 7: Three sets of policies across three perspectives/philosophies/models (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)

### 3.4 Alternative Policy Sets For Each Philosophy/Perspective/Model

Figures 8, 9 and 10 display the effects of the alternative policies sets for each of the philosophies or models. Before looking at these Figures, one would expect a set of policies that corresponds to a particular perspective to outperform the other sets of policies. That does not seem to be the case on the ensemble level. The first perspective seems to be best served by policy set 3 in terms of domestic key performance indicators. Moreover, policy set 2 outperform policy set 1 in terms of its effects on all four key performance indicators. Note however, that these conclusions are solely based on the outlier behaviour of the ensembles. To draw this conclusion for all simulations in the ensembles, we need to perform a detailed investigation into the effects for individual runs or sets of runs (see section 4).




Figure 8: Three sets of policies for perspective/philosophy/model 1 only (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)




Figure 9: Three sets of policies for perspective/philosophy/model 2 only (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)




Figure 10: Three sets of policies for perspective/philosophy/model 3 only (top-left: foreign fighters cs; top-right: total in jail; bottom-left: total domestic extremists; bottom-right: domestic extremist acts)

Figure 9 shows that the ex-ante assumption (that a set of policies that corresponds to a particular perspective outperforms the other sets of policies) applies to the second perspective/philosophy/model. Interestingly, Figure 10 shows that the second policy set also seems to perform relatively well for the third perspective/philosophy/model. From the last three Figures, it seems as though the second policy set is most promising. Before firmly concluding that this is indeed the case, we need to test this conclusion in detail across all runs or across sets of runs. To do so requires complex ensemble analysis or robustness analysis. This will be the subject of the next section.

#### 4. Policy Robustness and Adaptive Robust Design

This section is still work in progress. The following analyses will soon be reported on in this section: (i) ensemble comparison as in Auping *et al.* (2014) and Kwakkel *et al.* (2014); (ii) robustness analysis as in Lempert *et al.* (2003) and Pruyt *et al.* (201?); and (iii) Adaptive Robust Design as in Hamarat *et al.* (2013,2014).<sup>1</sup>

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## 5. Concluding Remarks and Current/Future Work

### 5.1 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Foreign fighters are an important current security issue for many Western Nations. There seem to be distinct perspectives/philosophies regarding the underlying (policy) mechanisms with regard to the foreign fighter security issue between and within Western nations.

Instead of trying to prove which perspective out of a set of alternative perspectives is “right”, we use a model-based approach to test sets of policies across alternative perspectives to test which set works across a large uncertainty space and across the different perspectives.

From our preliminary analysis, it seems as though the policies set that corresponds to the perspective of Denmark and Finland (“let’s talk and help to (re-)integrate”) outperforms the policies set that corresponds to the more restrictive perspective (“keep them here and jail upon return”) across the different perspectives.

Whether this is actually the case, needs to be further investigated. It may also be due to the preliminary models (that may be too simplistic and not be fully representative of the different perspectives).

### 5.2 Current/Future Work

This paper presents work in progress. This is a first preliminary step of a much larger research effort. The preliminary models presented here are simplistic. They need to be extended and adapted to the local settings of the different Western nations that will be studied. The analytical part of our research is also under development.

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