So as to stabilize the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at tolerable levels, global emissions should dramatically be reduced soon within this century. To achieve this end, a long term global cooperation and developing country participation is essential. In this paper, we take the “Contraction and Convergence” framework first proposed by the CSE of India as one possible treaty and investigate the long term abatement and trading behavior of countries with economic growth. Dynamic simulation based economic experiments is the method. Seven countries with potential buyers and sellers trade permits in the global market for 25 years. For each simulated year, asks and bids of the countries /regions are collected and permit prices are set at the equilibrium price. In the first treatment, annual national quotas expire each year and the countries cannot save their allowances. In the second treatment, the countries are allowed to transfer quota surplus /deficit up to 30 /20 percent of their annual emissions to the next year. One hypothesis is that, neither the developed nor the developing countries will make sufficient timely reductions and they will create unanticipated costs for their economies as the quota prices increase over the years. An implication of this result is global cooperation being threatened under more stringent reduction requirements and increasing costs of compliance.