he deregulation of the Colombian electricity market took place in 1994 and the pool started operation in 1995. The Colombian market adopted a capacity charge mechanism to increase incentives for investment in new capacity. The capacity charge proved to be weak in terms of transparency and incentives, causing negative effects on investment. Nowadays, the application of the capacity charge is over and a new mechanism is in place. The new mechanism, the reliability charge, intends to provide reliability to the system. We have previously used a non-standard system dynamics approach to evaluate alternative regulation schemes for the Colombian Electricity Market. In this paper, we have updated the system dynamic model, formerly built, to evaluate alternatives to the capacity charge mechanism. We have also assessed the effect that the reliability charge mechanism may have over the market and found that the proposed scheme may actually overcome some of the drawbacks of the previous scheme; however, simulations indicate that this may not have the desirable effects prompt enough to avoid blackouts.