




PROFILER

AN 'EFFECTS-BASED' MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGER

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Introduction

'Profiler' is a sophisticated military capability management tool that links strategic outcomes with the physical elements of capability that can be bundled together to deliver those outcomes. It utilises a powerful many-to-many relationship structure that binds and links the outcomes (or what I have termed 'effects') with the means, through capacities and finally to the physical elements of capability which are specified as *People, Organisation, Support and Facilities, Training, Equipment and Doctrine*.

Developing the Effects, Means and Capacities Lists

The list of 19 *Effects* was created from a detailed consideration of 20 *scenarios*, which were rich narratives describing degraded states of **domestic, regional and/or international** stability. These *Effects* are what we seek to impose in resolving a crisis or conflict situation and give no consideration (in the early stages of the analysis) to the physical measures that would be expected to deliver these *Effects*. They are generic and 'context-free' (not anchored to any specific event or place) and, therefore, should readily transfer into any strategic situation. The list spans the full continuum from those that may require offensive actions to achieve at one extreme, to the restorative actions that may be called upon to relieve humanitarian disasters at the other extreme.

Effects List

The current list of *Effects* is:

1. Broaden range of influence.
 2. Coerce individuals and groups.
 3. Conform to domestic/friendly community expectation.
 4. Counter instability/restore working community.
 5. Deny freedom of action/dominate an area.
 6. Deter specific behaviour (actions/involvement).
 7. Discourage strategic opportunism and adventurism.
 8. Disrupt/destabilise operations and business markets.
 9. Establish and preserve dialogue.
 10. Generate/foment instability.
 11. Increase risk/cost to opponent.
 12. Induce/compel deployments.
 13. Influence/support dissident group.
 14. Inform decision-making.
 15. Minimise a vulnerability.
 16. Relieve humanitarian disaster.
 17. Shape (prevent/inhibit/interdict/channel /encourage) movement and supply.
 18. Shape public (world/domestic/opponent) opinion.
 19. Undermine general trust/morale.
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Means

The *Means* list was developed out of a consideration of what could be reasonably expected to make a contribution towards delivering the stated *Effects*. For example: *Effect* 14 – Inform decision-making – could be achieved by a combination of the following *Means*:

- 1 - Accompany other forces;
- 6 - Collect Humint;
- 7 - Collect technical information/items; and
- 42 - Wide surveillance.

Means List

The current list of *Means* is:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Accompany other forces. | 22. Gather information from stand-off (technical/cueing). |
| 2. Attack by close action. | 23. Generate/train forces. |
| 3. Attack by stand off. | 24. Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO effort. |
| 4. Attack leader moral/financial integrity/authority. | 25. Interfere with aircraft movement and facilities. |
| 5. Close recon/monitor specific target/named area of interest. | 26. Manipulate financial holdings/stocks. |
| 6. Collect human source intelligence. | 27. Manipulate/damage business functions. |
| 7. Collect technical information/items. | 28. Materiel/financial/intelligence assistance to dissident movements (onshore also). |
| 8. Create false business or inject super-competitive products. | 29. Orchestrate 3rd party attack. |
| 9. Cue precision weapons. | 30. Penetrate/ threaten leader physical security. |
| 10. Damage product or brand. | 31. Penetrate/infiltrate groups/networks. |
| 11. Deceive physically/electronically. | 32. Provide close protection. |
| 12. Deny resources/render key infrastructure ineffective. | 33. Provide communications. |
| 13. Disrupt shipping and facilities. | 34. Provide vital services and/or resources. |
| 14. Disseminate physical/electronic psyops material. | 35. Recover detainees/friendly forces/ authorised personnel. |
| 15. Empower local functionaries and support local organisations. | 36. Release selected information. |
| 16. Enable infrastructure. | 37. Seize and recover individuals or groups. |
| 17. Engage with neutral/hostile groups through intermediaries. | 38. Sponsor relocation. |
| 18. Escort specialists. | 39. Strike individuals or groups. |
| 19. Establish haven. | |
| 20. Foster and exploit relationships with key individuals. | |
| 21. Gather evidence. | |
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| 40. Tap-hack electronic information systems. | 41. Threaten/damage leader personal wealth. |
| | 42. Wide surveillance. |

Capacities

Capacities were derived from *Means* and comprise the abilities that need to be possessed in order to make the *Means* achievable. Continuing the example above, the *Means* for collect human source intelligence would rely heavily on the ability to:

- 11 - Elicit information;
- 16 - Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms; and
- 17 - Establish rapport/win trust.

Capacities List

The current list of *Capacities* is:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Administer business. | 24. Interfere with electronic/manual information systems. |
| 2. Analyse information. | 25. Interfere with production and services. |
| 3. Assess and respond to threats. | 26. Manage distribution of resources. |
| 4. Breach information systems. | 27. Manoeuvre on and over land. |
| 5. Broadcast information. | 28. Manoeuvre on and under the water. |
| 6. Build personal profile. | 29. Move with stealth. |
| 7. Communicate electronically. | 30. Observe, record/photograph, collate and report information. |
| 8. Communicate using foreign languages. | 31. Observe/monitor using surveillance/intercept devices. |
| 9. Defeat security systems. | 32. Operate in a civilian environment. |
| 10. Deliver training. | 33. Place surveillance/intercept devices. |
| 11. Elicit information. | 34. Provide funds. |
| 12. Employ destructive materials. | 35. Provide medical/health support. |
| 13. Employ small arms. | 36. Provide shelters and basic living facilities. |
| 14. Employ support weapons. | 37. Recreate events. |
| 15. Employ target acquisition and cueing devices. | 38. Seal an area. |
| 16. Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms. | 39. Secure an area. |
| 17. Establish rapport/win trust. | 40. Seize an area. |
| 18. Evade capture. | |
| 19. Evade surveillance and access control measures. | |
| 20. Handle and preserve evidence. | |
| 21. Handle and secure personnel. | |
| 22. Identify networks of contacts. | |
| 23. Implement psyops. | |
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41. Track financial dealings and assets exchanges
42. Utilise service and civilian aircraft, watercraft and vehicles.

Linking Effects, Means and Capacities

Linking, or building the many-to-many relationships, was an iterative process whereby each means was anchored to an effect and each capacity was anchored to a means. The result of this is illustrated at Figure 1 below. The first column contains the effects with lines that trace to the means (second column), the third column contains the capacities with links to both means and the items within POSTED (the right-most column).




Figure 1. Composite image of Effects, Means, Capacities and POSTED linkages.

Assigning Values to the Effects-Means Pairs

In order to secure additional meaning and relevance to the construct developed thus far a numerical rating system was necessary. This was achieved by pairing the effects and means and determining the appropriate numbers on a four-point, four dimension scale of Political Exposure, Immediacy of Effect, Totality of Effect and Capability to Undertake. The form used to enter this data is displayed at Figure 2.




Figure 2. Assigning values to Means-Effects pairs.

Management Decision-Making Aids

The intersection point (indicated by a coloured rectangle) on the chart at Figure 3 indicates that a relationship has been established between a *Means* and an *Effect*.




Figure 3. Chart displaying Overt-Political Exposure.

The colour indicates the averaged ratings awarded and illustrates the relative Political Exposure associated with the application of a particular *Means* to bring about a desired *Effect*. Non-coloured rectangles indicate that no relationship exists. Similar charts can be produced from the data to indicate other operation types against Immediacy of Effect, Totality of Effect and Capability to Undertake.

Conclusion

The 'Effect-Based' Military Capability Manager offers a powerful decision-making tool for the maintenance and use of military forces. It links effects, means and capacities to the physical elements of capability, securing valuable knowledge on questions of readiness and the appropriateness of various courses of action.

Further detailed research is required in the area of POSTED (People, Organisation, Support and Facilities, Training, Equipment and Doctrine) to produce information on how these can be configured in various ways to shape capability and maximise fitness for purpose.
